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Abstract
We consider a model of bribery in an asymmetric procurement auction. In return for a bribe
from the dishonest supplier, the auctioneer has the discretion to allow this supplier to revise his
bid downward to match the low bid of the honest supplier. The dishonest supplier can also win the
contract outright without paying a bribe by bidding below the honest supplier. We investigate the
effect of the bribe share and the cost distributions on the bidding functions, the allocative distortion,
and the expected price paid by the buyer. The dishonest supplier bids more aggressively to win
the contract outright when the auctioneer takes a larger bribe share. Bribery and the implied right
of first refusal introduce a new allocative distortion in favor of the dishonest supplier. Finally, we
use the power family of cost distributions to examine the expected price paid by the buyer. When
the dishonest supplier has a more favorable cost distribution, there exist bribe shares sufficiently
large such that the expected price paid by the buyer can actually decline as a result of bribery.
KEYWORDS: bribery, favoritism, auctions
∗Roberto Burguet: Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC), Campus UAB, Bellaterra, Barcelona,
Spain 08193. Martin K. Perry: Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick,
New Jersey, USA 08901. Martin Perry would like to acknowledge the financial support of the
IAE (Institute for Economic Analysis, CSIC) and ICREA (Catalan Institute for Research and Ad-
vanced Studies) located in Barcelona, Spain. Roberto Burguet would like to acknowledge financial
support of FEDER (European Fund for Regional Development), the Spanish Ministry of Science
and Technology, and CREA (Center of Reference in Economic Analysis, located in Barcelona,
Spain) and the Sidney I. Simon Memorial Fund in the Department of Economics at Rutgers Uni-
versity. We also acknowledge comments from the participants of departmental workshops and
conferences where we have presented this research, particularly Juan Jose Ganuza (University of
Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain) and Richard P. McLean (Rutgers University, New Brunswick,
N.J.). Finally, we acknowledge the helpful questions and comments from the editor and referees
for the B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics.
1.  Introduction
In this paper we analyze bribery as a monetary side-payment by a supplier to an
auctioneer in order to alter the award of a procurement contract in favor of the
supplier.1 The auctioneer represents a buyer in the procurement of some good.
The buyer could be a government or a corporation, and the auctioneer would be a
procurement official or employee.
The award of the contract in return for a payment could take different
forms in different contexts. In this paper, we will analyze the exchange between a
corrupt auctioneer and a dishonest supplier whereby the auctioneer allows the
supplier to revise his bid, when necessary to win the contract. That is, the
auctioneer cannot award the contract at a price above the lowest bid from the
auction, but he can favor the dishonest supplier by awarding him the contract at
that price. In effect, when the dishonest supplier does not submit the lowest bid,
he still has a right of first refusal to accept the contract at the lowest bid of the
other suppliers. We use the term “favoritism” to describe the special case in which
the auctioneer does not require a bribe from the dishonest supplier in exchange for
awarding the contract under this right of first refusal.
This specification of the auctioneer’s discretion in awarding the contract
resembles some documented examples of bribery. For instance, Ingraham (2005)
examines bribery in contracts awarded by the New York City School
Construction Authority from 1990 - 1997. When the bids were to be opened
publicly to identify the winner of the contract, the auctioneer saved the bid from
the bribing supplier to open last and then submitted a new, winning bid for this
supplier. Since the bribing supplier could withdraw from the contract if the new
winning bid underestimated his costs, the auctioneer secretly created a right of
first refusal during the auction process. Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2000) cite two
major international construction projects (an airport in Berlin and a power station
in Singapore) in which bribes were paid to obtain the bids that were submitted by
the rivals. More generally, this paper provides some insights into favoritism with
or without bribes. Government procurement officers are known to have accepted
bribes from suppliers and corporations are known to favor certain suppliers of
various inputs.
The goal of this paper is to examine the effects of this form of bribery or
favoritism on the allocation of contracts and prices. We first examine how bribery
or favoritism affects the bidding strategies of suppliers competing in a
                                                
1  See Noonan (1984) for a history of bribery. See Rose-Ackerman (1999) for a general survey of
corruption and potential solutions with specific examples of bribery to government officials for
procurement contracts in Chapter 3.
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procurement auction. We then identify the effects of bribery on the allocation of
contracts and the expected price paid by the buyer.
In Section 2, we discuss the literature most related to our paper. This
discussion explains the key distinctions between the differing models and results
in the literature. In doing so, we also explain how our approach to bribery differs
from the existing literature.
In Section 3, we present the model where two suppliers compete in a first-
price auction (FPA) to win a procurement contract, but one supplier is favored by
the auctioneer. The supplier who is favored will be called the “dishonest supplier”
(DS), and the other supplier called the “honest supplier” (HS). The auctioneer
demands a share of the post-auction “surplus” defined as the difference between
the low bid of the HS and the cost of the DS, whenever this difference is positive.
We call this a “bribe share”.
Bribery or favoritism alters the bidding strategies of both suppliers. The
bidding strategy of the HS will account for the fact that the DS will be favored by
the auctioneer. The bidding strategy of the DS will account for both the
opportunity to bribe the auctioneer and the cost of doing so. In Section 4, we
characterize these equilibrium bidding strategies and analyze how the size of the
bribe share affects this behavior. Although one might conjecture that bribery
would induce the HS to bid more aggressively and the DS to bid less
aggressively, we explain why this need not be the case. In particular, when the
bribe share paid to the auctioneer is large, the DS may bid more aggressively than
the HS, as well as more aggressively than he would have in the absence of the
opportunity to bribe the auctioneer.
In Section 5 we first analyze the allocative effects of bribery. We compare
the allocative distortion with bribery to that which arises in an asymmetric FPA
without bribery and an optimal auction. Bribery favors allocation of the contract
to the DS, whether he is ex ante stronger or weaker than the HS in the sense of
first order stochastic dominance of the cost distribution. This contrasts with both
the FPA and the optimal auction. Moreover, with bribery, the allocative distortion
is more pronounced for low cost realizations of the HS. Indeed, the HS chooses
his bid to compete against the cost of the DS. Thus, the allocative distortions will
be solely determined by the bidding behavior of the DS. Under mild conditions,
the lower the cost of the HS, the higher the margin of his bid above his cost.
In Section 6 we show that bribery may in fact result in a lower expected
price paid by the buyer, even though the allocative distortions are not optimal and
even though the bribe paid to the auctioneer is a pure loss for the buyer. We
illustrate this result by analytically solving the model for a convenient family of
cost distributions. The expected price will be lower than either the expected price
in a FPA or in an efficient auction (such as a second-price auction (SPA)) when
the bribe share is large and the HS is ex ante weaker than the DS.
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Section 7 concludes the paper and briefly discusses some other interesting
questions that can be addressed with this model.
2. Related Literature
There is a substantial and growing literature on bribery and favoritism in auctions.
In this section, we briefly summarize the major issues and findings of that
literature which are most closely related to our paper. 2
Several papers examine models in which any bidder (or supplier) can
bribe the auctioneer: Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986), Lien (1990),
Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2000, 2005), Menezes and Monteiro (2001, 2006),
Compte, Lambert-Mogiliansky, and Verdier (2005), and Koc and Neilson (2005).
These papers differ in the specification of the bribe, but the common feature is
that the auctioneer for a procurement auction has discretion to allow any supplier
with the lowest bid to receive a price equal to the second lowest bid. Lengwiler
and Wolfstetter (2005) describe this feature as “type I corruption”. Similarly, we
will refer to this feature as type I discretion by the auctioneer. The primary
finding of all these papers is that the introduction of a corrupt auctioneer will
modify a standard auction held by a seller (or buyer) into a “bribery auction” held
by the auctioneer. The term “bribery auction” is used to describe an auction in
which the presence of a corrupt auctioneer has no effect on the allocation of the
good (or the contract) and no effect on the expected profits of the bidders. In
particular, the bribery auction remains efficient and the bidders are indifferent to
an auction with or without bribery. Thus, bribery simply results in a transfer of
rents from the buyer to the auctioneer.
In our paper this transformation into a bribery auction does not occur.
There are two primary reasons for this. First, the model specifies that only some
suppliers can bribe the auctioneer, but that the other suppliers cannot. Second, our
model assumes a different specification for the auctioneer’s discretion. In
particular, the auctioneer has the discretion to award the contract to a losing
supplier at the price equal to the lowest bid by the winning supplier. Thus, the
favored losing supplier will bribe the auctioneer to receive the contract whenever
his cost is below the lowest bid of the other suppliers. Lengwiler and Wolfstetter
(2005) describe this feature as “type II corruption”, so we will similarly refer to it
as type II discretion by the auctioneer.
In this paper, we examine type II discretion by the auctioneer. There are
several reasons why type II discretion is interesting. First, type II discretion does
                                                
2 There is a related literature in which suppliers bribe a third party who provides an assessment of
the quality in a multi-attribute procurement auction. For example, see Celentani and Ganuza
(2002), and Burguet and Che (2004).  See also Laffont and Tirole (1991).
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not result in a bribery auction that simply preserves efficiency while transferring
rents to the auctioneer.3 Second, we have shown in Burguet and Perry (1999) that
a model with type II discretion can be easily extended to include type I discretion.
Third, favoritism by the auctioneer (or the buyer) toward one supplier is a natural
special case of type II discretion. Favoritism means that the favored supplier who
loses the bidding (or does not bid) can still obtain the contract at a price equal to
the lowest bid from the other suppliers, but without paying a bribe to the
auctioneer (or the buyer). As such, the favored supplier effectively has a right of
first refusal on the contract at a price equal to the lowest bid from the other
suppliers, even if he never bids to win the contract.
Several recent papers have discussed the implications of a right of first
refusal in auctions. These papers include Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2004),
Porter and Shoham (2005), and Bikhchandani, Lippman, and Ryan (2005), Choi
(2003) and Lee (2004). Applied to a procurement auction, these papers examine
the implications of the right of first refusal granted to one supplier by a buyer (or
auctioneer) on the bidding behavior of the other suppliers and the resulting price
paid by the buyer.4 The papers by Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2004) and
Porter and Shoham (2005) introduce an auctioneer who grants the right of first
refusal instead of the buyer. However neither paper has an explicit model of the
bribery payments to the auctioneer. As a result, the supplier with the right of first
refusal can be interpreted as bidding his cost, bidding any price above his cost
including his highest possible cost, or not bidding at all. In contrast, our model
explicitly defines the bribery payments as a share of the surplus generated by the
right of first refusal. The supplier with this right of first refusal still has an
incentive to bid against the other suppliers because he could win the contract
outright and avoid paying a bribe when he has a low cost and submits the lowest
bid. This will determine the bidding behavior of the supplier with the right of first
refusal, alter the bribery payments to the auctioneer, and affect the expected price
paid by the buyer in a variety of ways.
                                                
3 Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2005) allow the auctioneer to choose between type I corruption and
type II corruption. Using numerical examples, they find that the equilibrium bidding functions do
not always result in efficient allocations. Thus, despite symmetry, the auction does not degenerate
into a bribery auction. These results suggest that type II corruption introduces inefficiencies even
when type I corruption is present.
4 Bikhchandani, Lippman, and Ryan (2005) examine a right of first refusal in a second-price
auction, whereas Choi (2003) examines a right of first refusal in a first-price auction. With private
values, the gains of the favored buyer exactly offset the seller’s loses in a second-price auction,
whereas the joint expected profits of the seller and the favored buyer are higher in a first-price
auction.  
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3. The Model of Bribery
The buyer has a value v for a good with a fixed quantity and quality. The buyer
employs an auctioneer who receives bids from suppliers and awards a contract for
the buyer to purchase the good from one of the suppliers using a sealed-bid first-
price auction (FPA). In a fair auction without bribery or favoritism, the contract
would be awarded to the supplier with the lowest bid at a price equal to that bid.
In contrast, we examine an auction in which the auctioneer can provide a right of
first refusal to one of the suppliers. If no bribe is required from this supplier for
the right of first refusal, then we will refer to him as the “favored” supplier. But
more generally, if this supplier must pay a bribe for the right of first refusal, then
we will refer to him as the “dishonest” supplier (DS). We assume that there is one
other supplier called the “honest” supplier (HS).5 We do not allow the auctioneer
to consider bribes from both suppliers. Moreover, we do not address which
supplier is the DS and which is the HS.6
An important feature of our model is that the two suppliers are asymmetric
in that they have different distributions for their costs of producing the good. We
assume that each supplier draws his cost of production ci, where i = d (DS) or h
(HS), from a distribution Gi(c) with a common support [0,1], and a positive
density gi(c) over this support. The cost ci is private information for each supplier,
but the distribution functions are common knowledge. For simplicity, we also
assume that the value of the buyer exceeds the highest possible cost realization (v
> 1). Finally, we assume that the costs of the suppliers are independently
distributed. Thus, we will examine bribery and favoritism in an asymmetric
independent private value (cost) FPA. The suppliers simultaneously bid for the
contract, knowing their cost, knowing the cost distribution of the other supplier,
and also knowing the form in which bribery or favoritism occurs.
The auctioneer runs a sealed-bid FPA and must award the contract at a
price equal to the lowest bid. If the auctioneer has some discretion in awarding the
contract and/or setting the price paid by the buyer, he can extract a bribe from the
dishonest supplier. In this paper, we will focus on a specification of the
auctioneer’s discretion in which he must set the price equal to the lowest bid, but
that he need not award the contract to the honest supplier who makes the lowest
                                                
5 The model with general cost distributions could be characterized in terms of multiple symmetric
honest suppliers. However, the general insights are fully illustrated with one honest supplier. In
Appendix 2 where Proposition 4 is proved, we discuss the extension to multiple honest suppliers.
6 This question obviously requires that the suppliers be asymmetric. This question has been
partially addressed in a companion paper Burguet and Perry (2003, revised 2005) where we
examined upfront payments directly to the buyer (or similarly, upfront bribes to the auctioneer) in
return for acquiring a right of first refusal (called “preference”) during the subsequent auction.
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bid.  If the bid of the DS is higher than that of the HS, the auctioneer can award
the contract to the DS at a price equal to the bid of the HS.7 Even though the DS
submitted a higher bid, the DS has a right of first refusal at a price equal to the
lower bid by the HS. Conversely, if the bid of the DS is below the bid of the HS,
we assume that the DS is simply awarded the contract at a price equal to his bid.
Let bd and bh, be the bids of the DS and the HS respectively. If bh > bd ,
the contract is awarded to the DS at a price equal to his bid. However, if bd > bh,
bribery or favoritism may occur. In particular, when bd > bh > cd, there is
“surplus” (bh – cd) which can be divided between the auctioneer and the DS. In
these cases, the auctioneer awards the contract to the DS at a price bh, and the
auctioneer receives a share α ∈ [0,1] of the surplus (bh − cd).8 We call α the
“bribe share”. Finally, if bd > cd > bh, there is no surplus that the auctioneer and
DS can share, and the HS is awarded the contract at a price equal to his bid.
The bribe share α is determined prior to the auction and thus is
independent of the outcome of the auction. The DS knows the value of α  prior to
submitting his bid.  The HS need not know the specific value of the bribe share α
. Rather, all the HS needs to know is that the DS has a right of first refusal at a
price equal to this bid and will thereby obtain the contract whenever bh > cd.
The bribe share could be interpreted as the relative bargaining power
between the auctioneer and the DS. It may have arisen informally from past
practice of the auctioneer. Also, it could be determined by giving the auctioneer a
percentage of the stock in the subsidiary of the DS handling the contract. The
auctioneer would then receive bribery payments in the form of dividends from
that subsidiary after the contract is completed and the DS is paid by the buyer.
In order to calculate the bribery payments when the bribe share is strictly
positive, the bid of the HS must be verifiable to the DS and the cost of the DS
must be verifiable to the auctioneer. If the bids are submitted in writing, the
auctioneer can verify the bid of the HS from the signed bidding materials
submitted by the HS. However, it may be more difficult for the DS to verify his
cost. The cost of the DS might be verifiable from the ex ante bid preparation
documents of the DS. However, it seems more natural to assume that the cost of
                                                
7  One justification for restricting the price to be equal or below the bid of the HS is that the price
may become known at the end of the auction. The HS who was not awarded the contract could
complain to the buyer if his bid were below the resulting price.  In government procurement, the
HS may be able to sue the government.
8 We assume that any compensation to the auctioneer from the buyer is independent of the
auctioneer’s actions in awarding the contract, and that there are no punishments for accepting
bribes. We are not attempting to model the agency problem between the buyer and the auctioneer.
On this, see Krueger (1974), Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978), Rasmusen and Ramseyer (1994), and
Mookherjee and Png (1995).
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the DS is verifiable from the ex post accounting records of expenditures by the
DS. It should be noted that when the bribe share is zero, the costs of the DS need
not be verifiable.9
4.  Equilibrium Conditions for the Bidding Functions
In this section, we characterize the equilibria in a sealed-bid FPA for the basic
model of bribery assuming general distribution functions for the costs of the two
suppliers. Bribery will generally alter the equilibrium bidding functions of both
suppliers. However, we find that bribery does not make the equilibrium bidding
functions uniformly more or less aggressive for either supplier.
In general, it is difficult to solve for the equilibrium bidding functions in
an asymmetric FPA. The asymmetric FPA becomes more tractable with bribery.
In particular, the game is dominance solvable. Once we exclude bids by the DS
below his cost and exclude the rejection of contracts by the DS at a price above
his cost, the HS has a dominant strategy against which the DS can then choose his
bidding strategy. Indeed, the HS is effectively bidding against cost of the DS. As
a result, the bidding strategy of the HS is independent of both the bidding strategy
of the DS and the value of the bribe share α. The HS calculates his bidding
strategy bh(c) by solving the following problem:
(1)  [ ] [ ] .  )(1)(    ;max bGcbcbb dh −⋅−=Π
The first-order condition of this problem is
(2)     [ ]   0    )()(    )(1  =⋅−−− bgcbbG dd .10
The best response of the DS against the bidding strategy )(cbh  of the HS is
obtained by solving the following problem:
(3)
[ ]
[ ] .)())(()1(     ))((1 )( 
 )(,;max
)(
)(
1
1
1∫ −− ⋅−⋅α−+−⋅−
=⋅Π
− bb
cb
h
h
xdGcxbbbGcb
bcbb
hhhh
hd
                                                
9  If the DS has no credible way to inform the auctioneer about its true cost, then bargaining would
occur under asymmetric information. In this case, efficient bargaining is possible only in the
special case in which α = 0 (favoritism). See Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
10 Note that this bidding function is equivalent to the best take-it-or-leave-it offer that a supplier
with cost c can make to a buyer with a random valuation in the interval [0,1] given by the
distribution function Gd.
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The first term is the expected profit when the DS wins the auction outright
without bribery or favoritism. The second term is the expected profit when the DS
loses the auction (b > bh), but bribes the auctioneer because his costs are below
the bid of the HS (bh > c). In this case, the DS retains the share (1−α) of the
surplus (bh - c). The first-order condition for this problem is
(4) [ ] 0    )())(()(    ))((1 111 =⋅⋅−⋅−− −−−
db
bdb
bbgcbbbG hhhhh α .
In order to ensure that the first order conditions (2) and (4) are sufficient to define
the equilibrium bidding functions of the HS, )(cbh , and the DS, )(cbd , we need
some conditions on the distributions Gh and Gd .
Lemma:  Assume Gi, for i=h,d, is twice differentiable and with a decreasing
inverse hazard rate )(
)(1
xig
xiG− . Also, assume that )(
)(1
    xdg
xdG- x(x)Jd
−=  is convex.
Then an equilibrium of the FPA with bribery is ( )(cbh , )(cbd ), where )(cbh  is
implicitly defined by (2), )(cbd = max { )0(hb , )(cbd }, and )(cbd  is the solution
to (4).
The function Jd(x) is equivalent to what is known as the "virtual valuation" in the
literature on auction theory. The proof of the lemma is contained in the Appendix
1.11 The effects of the bribe share α  on the bidding behavior of both suppliers are
easy to characterize.
Proposition 1: The bidding function of the honest supplier, bh(c) is independent
of the bribe share α. However, the bidding function of the dishonest supplier,
bd(c), shifts downward as the bribe share increases.
Proof: The first result is obvious from inspection of the first-order condition (2)
defining )(cbh . The second result follows from differentiating the first-order
condition (4) with respect to the bid b of the dishonest supplier and the bribe share
α :
                                                
11  This lemma and the proof are due to Richard P. McLean at Rutgers University.
8
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 23
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art23
0  /
)(1
  ))(1(  )()(
22 <∂∂
−
⋅−⋅−−
−= b db
bhdbbhbhgcb
d
cddb
dπα ,
where 22 / bd ∂∂ π  is obtained by differentiating the left-hand side of (4) with
respect to b.  This derivative is negative for interior solutions of (3). QED
The DS would never bid below the minimum bid of the HS. Otherwise,
the DS could raise his bid without reducing the probability of winning the auction
outright. Thus, if the solution to (4) is less than )0(hb , the DS simply bids )0(hb .
At the highest cost realization, both suppliers bid their cost: bh(1) = bd(1) = 1.
When α = 0, the DS bids unity for all cost realizations: bd(c) = 1. Thus, with
favoritism, the DS does not effectively bid for the contract, but is awarded the
contract whenever his cost is below the bid of the HS. On the other hand, when
α > 0, the DS will bid to win the auction outright in order to avoid paying the
bribe: bd (c) < 1 for all c < 1. It is easy to show that the DS prefers a smaller bribe
share.12
We can now examine the effect of bribery on the bidding strategies of the
suppliers. Proposition 1 does not fully answer this question because no value of
the bribe share corresponds to a fair auction without bribery or favoritism. Even in
the case for which the DS pays the full surplus as a bribe to the auctioneer (α = 1)
and thus bids aggressively to win the contract outright with the low bid, the HS
still bids against the cost of the DS, and not against the bid of the DS.
Consider the first-order conditions (2) and (4) for the symmetric case Gd =
Gh. The first term of each condition is the probability of winning the contract
outright for any given bid. This is the incentive to raise the bid because the
marginal increase in expected profit from a higher bid is the probability of
winning the contract outright. In other words, higher bids increase the profit on
contracts that the supplier wins outright in the auction. For a given cost realization
common to both suppliers, the first term in (2) for the HS is always less than the
corresponding term in (4) for the DS. This follows immediately from symmetry
(Gd = Gh) and the fact that bbbh <− )(1 . The second term in the two first-order
conditions is the disincentive to raise the bid. Higher bids increase the probability
of losing the auction and losing the corresponding profit on those contracts. The
second term for the DS is multiplied by the bribe share α  because the DS loses
                                                
12  For any given cost realization c and bid b, the profit function (3) of the DS is decreasing in α.
As a result, the envelope theorem implies that a lower bribe share will increase the expected
profits of the DS.
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only the fraction α of the difference between his bid and his cost on the contracts
for which his bid exceeds the bid of the HS. Thus, when α < 1, the DS has a
smaller disincentive to raise his bid, inducing him to bid less aggressively.
These two forces suggest that the DS bids less aggressively than the HS.
However, there is an additional factor in the second term of the first-order
condition of the DS: dbbdbh /)(
1− . This factor is the slope of the inverse bidding
function of the HS. When the DS increases his bid marginally above b, this factor
is defined as the additional cost realizations of the HS for which the HS submitted
a bid lower than b. For these contracts which are no longer won outright, the DS
losses the fraction α of the surplus when he obtains these contracts by a bribe.
This factor may well be greater than unity,13 in which case the DS experiences a
greater probability of losing the auction outright when he increases his bid
marginally. Thus, this factor increases the disincentive of the DS to raise his bid.
This third force works against the two previous forces, and is the reason why
there is no general result that the DS bids less aggressively than the HS.
We can also compare the bidding function of the HS to the bidding
function of a supplier in a symmetric FPA without bribery. The first-order
condition for the bidding function of ith supplier without bribery is
(6) [ ] ,  0    )())(()(    ))((1 111 =⋅⋅−−− −−−
db
bdb
bbgcbbbG jjjjj
where j denotes the other supplier. Comparing this condition to the first-order
condition (2) for the HS, we see that the same tradeoffs apply. The first term
representing the incentive to raise the bid would be larger without bribery.
However, the second term representing the disincentive to raise the bid can also
be larger because the factor dbbdbh /)(
1−  may be greater than 1. Thus, it is not
clear in general whether favoritism toward the DS will cause the HS to bid more
aggressively than he would in a FPA without bribery.
Even if the DS and HS both had the same cost distribution, there is no
one-sided result on whether the HS would bid more or less aggressively than in a
FPA without bribery.  For this symmetric case, Arozamena and Weinschelbaum
(2004) and Porter and Shoham (2004) have shown that convexity (or concavity)
of the inverse hazard rate of the cost distribution is the condition that would
determine whether one or more honest suppliers would bid more (or less)
aggressively against a remaining supplier who had a right of first refusal at the
                                                
13 This factor will be greater than unity whenever the margin between bid and cost of the HS,
bh(c) − c, is decreasing in c. For example, this will be true when gd(c) is non-decreasing in c. It
will also be true for the family of cost distributions defined in Section 6.
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lowest bid of the honest suppliers.14 In our asymmetric case in which the HS and
DS have different cost distributions, this condition is not sufficient to determine
the bidding behavior of the HS.
In Burguet and Perry (1999), we examined the model with both type I and
type II discretion by the auctioneer. With the addition of type I discretion, the
price paid by the buyer is always equal the bid of the HS. Given the form of the
bribe, the resulting bidding behavior of the DS is solely designed to reduce the
bribery payments to the auctioneer. If the DS must pay the same bribe share when
type I discretion is exercised, α·(bh - bd), the bidding function of the DS would
then be the same as the solution to (4) for α = 1. There are also two other simple
cases. If the DS must pay a bribe share for type I discretion, but not for type II
discretion, the DS would bid his highest possible cost realization, bd(c) = 1, the
same as the solution to (4) for α = 0. As such, the DS would only obtain the
contract with the exercise of type II discretion by the auctioneer. Conversely, if
the DS must pay a bribe share for type II discretion, but not for type I discretion,
the DS would bid his cost (or lower) and only obtain the contract with the
exercise of type I discretion by the auctioneer.
5.  The Effect of Bribery on the Allocation of Contracts
With bribery, the allocation of contracts is independent of the bidding behavior by
the DS, and the bribe share. As such, the allocation is determined solely by the
bidding function of the HS. The bidding function of the HS depends on the
distribution of costs of the DS, Gd (see equation (2)). A change in Gd that causes
the HS to bid more aggressively reduces the expected allocative distortion for any
given value of cd. When the difference between the bid and the cost of the HS is
smaller, it is less likely that the cost of the DS cd lies between the two. In fact, if
the change in the distribution of the dishonest supplier lowers the inverse hazard
rate, the HS unambiguously bids more aggressively for any cost realization. Thus,
by inspection of equation (2), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Given the cost realization of the dishonest supplier, the allocative
distortion from bribery is larger for cost distributions of the dishonest supplier
with a lower inverse hazard rate [ ]  )(
)(1 
cg
cG
d
d− . The allocative distortion is
independent of the bribe share α.
                                                
14  In Section 6, we use the power family of cost distributions to illustrate the effects of bribery on
the expected price paid by the buyer. This family of cost distributions has the special property that
the inverse hazard rate is linear in the cost. Thus, if the DS and HS have the same cost distribution
within this family, the HS would bid the same in a FPA with or without bribery.
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Asymmetric FPAs generate allocative distortions because a supplier who
bids more aggressively will be awarded the contract in some situations where his
costs are higher than that of the rival who bids less aggressively. As a
consequence, the allocative distortion in an asymmetric FPA without bribery
occurs by awarding the contract to the weaker supplier in cases where he has a
higher cost.15
In contrast, an asymmetric FPA with bribery allocates the contract to the
DS whenever the cost of the DS is below the bid of the HS. Since the HS bids
above his cost, the FPA with bribery distorts the allocation by awarding the
contract to the DS in cases where he has a higher cost. However, this distortion
occurs irrespective of whether the DS is stronger or weaker than the HS.
When the HS is stronger, a FPA with or without bribery favors the DS by
allocating the contract to him in some cases when he has a higher cost. However,
unlike a FPA without bribery, the allocative distortion in a FPA with bribery does
not vanish as the costs of the suppliers approach the lowest possible realization.
As in a FPA, an optimal mechanism favors allocating the contract to the
weaker supplier.16 Then, once again, a FPA with bribery distorts the allocation in
the opposite direction from the optimal mechanism when DS is the stronger
supplier. Moreover, even when the DS is the weaker supplier, the distortion with
bribery is very different from the optimal distortion. Indeed, in order to reduce
informational rents with the smallest negative impact on efficiency, an optimal
mechanism typically distorts the allocation in favor of the weaker DS more at the
higher cost realizations for the HS, whereas the distortion disappears as the cost
approaches the lowest possible realization. In a precise sense, bribery distorts the
allocation in the opposite direction from the optimal allocation mechanism.
Indeed, if the cost distribution of the DS is characterized by a monotone inverse
hazard rate, i.e., if [ ]   )(
)(1 
cg
cG
d
d− is decreasing, then the margin ccbh −)(  is
decreasing in c. This follows immediately from (2). That is, ccbh −)(  attains its
highest value at c = 0, and then decreases to zero as the cost c increases to one.
Therefore, when the cost of the HS is close to 1, the HS almost always wins the
contract whenever it is efficient for him to win. However, when the cost of the HS
is close to 0, the DS obtains the contract frequently when his cost is higher than
the cost of the HS: hdhh cccb >>)( .
                                                
15   See Lebrun (1999) and Waehrer (1999) for a more general examination of this issue.
16 See Myerson (1981), and McAfee and McMillan (1989). Rothkopf, Harstad, and Fu (2003)
discuss a model in which a particular form of type I corruption can be used by a buyer to
“subsidize” a weaker supplier with higher costs. They find that the buyer can benefit by increasing
the price paid to the weaker supplier above his winning bid.
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This discussion demonstrates that bribery is not an alternative way of
introducing distortions in the allocation of the contracts that will reduce the rents
of suppliers and reduces the expected price paid by the buyer in line with optimal
mechanisms.17 This notwithstanding, the next section shows that bribery need not
result in a higher expected price paid by the buyer.
6. The Effect of Bribery on the Expected Price Paid by the Buyer
In this section, we examine the effect of bribery on the expected price. One might
expect that the expected price paid by the buyer would increase with bribery.
First, bribery induces non-optimal allocative distortions. Second, the bribery
payment to the auctioneer is a tax on the procurement transaction. One might also
expect these problems to be more acute when the bribe share paid to the
auctioneer is higher.
For several reasons, we will show that these results need not obtain. First,
bribery may induce the HS to bid more aggressively. Second, from Proposition 1,
the DS bids more aggressively when the bribe share is higher. In fact, we can
show that
Proposition 3:  The expected price paid by the buyer is lower when the bribe
share α  is larger.
Proof: Notice that the bid of the HS is independent of α. On the other hand, from
our previous lemma, we found that 0)( <αd
cdbd  for c < 1. Since the price paid by
the buyer is simply the },min{ hd bb , the expected price is lower when α  is larger
for any realization of the cost hc . QED.
Now, if we again consider equations (2) and (4), we notice that for α = 1,
(4) is the same first-order condition that DS solves when competing in a FPA
without bribery. Equation (2), on the other hand, is the bidding function of a
supplier competing against a “virtual” competitor that bids its cost. We know that
the HS need not bid uniformly more aggressively than in a FPA without bribery.
Even if the HS does bid more aggressively, the DS need not bid uniformly more
aggressively. However, both the HS and DS could bid more aggressively over a
                                                
17 When suppliers have uniform distributions with different lower bounds on their domains, Lee
(2004) has shown that awarding a right of first refusal (α=0) to the weaker supplier, introduces
precisely the type of distortions that an optimal auction introduces, and may result in a lower price
for the buyer as well.
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sufficient range of costs such that the expected price paid by the buyer would
decline.
In order to examine this possibility, we define the one-parameter power
family of distribution functions G(c;t) = tc  ]1[1 −−  over the support [0,1] where c
is the cost and t > 0 is a parameter which can vary between the suppliers.18 The
corresponding density function is g(c;t) = 1]1[ −−⋅ tct . For higher t, G(c;t) is
higher and [ ]   )(
)(1 
cg
cG
d
d− is lower. The supplier with a higher t is stronger in the
sense of both first-order stochastic dominance and hazard rate dominance.
Let th define the cost distribution of the HS and td define the cost
distribution of the DS, and denote Gd(c) = G(c;td) and Gh(c) = G(c;th). The
equilibrium bidding function of the HS from (2) has the following linear form:
(7) c
t
t
t
cb
d
d
d
h ⋅+++= 1    1
1)( .
The equilibrium bidding function of the DS from (4) is slightly more
complicated. It takes the following form:
(8) c
t
t
t
cb
h
h
h
d ⋅⋅+
⋅+⋅+= α
α
αα 1    1
1    );(    for c c> ′ ,
   
dt+
=
1
1 ,  for  c c≤ ′ ,
where }
)1(
 
,0max{
dh
dh
tt
tt
c +⋅⋅
−⋅=′ α
α
. Figure 1 depicts representative bidding
functions of the suppliers for the two expressions of c′  in (8). If the two suppliers
are symmetric within this power family of cost distributions (t = td = th), then the
HS bids just as he would in a FPA without bribery.19 The DS bids uniformly less
aggressively than the HS for all bribe shares α < 1. However, if the auctioneer
extracts all the surplus from the DS (α = 1), then both suppliers bid just as they
                                                
18 Waehrer and Perry (2003) show that this distribution function is not as restrictive as it might
seem. Distributions of this form follow directly from natural properties, particularly a property
corresponding to constant returns to scale.
19 This finding follows from that fact that the inverse hazard rate is linear for the power family of
cost distributions.  See Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2004) and Porter and Shoham (2004).
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would in a symmetric FPA without bribery. In Appendix 2, we generalize these
bidding functions to the case of multiple symmetric honest suppliers.
bh(c) 
c
c'
bd(c;1)
1
1
bd(c;1/3)
bd(c;1/9)
bd(c;0) = 1
Figure 1:  Bidding Functions
td = 1 and th = 3
α = {0, 1/9, 1/3, 1}
 α
We can now examine the expected price with this family of distributions.
We first compare the expected price in the FPA with bribery to the expected price
that would arise with an efficient auction, like the second-price auction (SPA).20
Let ),;( hd ttEp α  be the expected price in the FPA with bribery, and ),( hd ttEpe
be the expected price in an efficient auction. See Appendix 2 for the expressions
of these expected prices. The following proposition provides comparisons of these
two expected prices.
Proposition 4:  (i) When td > th, the expected price in a first-price auction with
bribery can be below the expected price in a second-price auction.  In particular,
                                                
20 Without bribery, the allocation of the contract virtually determines the total surplus that can be
divided between the buyer and the suppliers, and how it is divided. This is an implication of the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem. See Myerson (1981). Thus, since a SPA allocates the contract to
the lowest cost supplier, the expected price in a SPA provides the natural reference point for the
division of total surplus in any efficient auction.
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there exists a set of bribe shares ]1,(α  such that for any α in this set,
).,;(),( hdhde ttEpttEp α>
(ii) When td ≤ th, the expected price in a first-price auction with bribery is above
the expected price in a second-price auction.  In particular,
),;(),( hdhd ttEpttEpe α≤    for all α ≤ 1, and
),;(),( hdhd ttEpttEpe α<   for td ≠ th or α < 1.
The proof of Proposition 4 is contained in Appendix 2. Appendix 2 also
provides a generalization of Proposition 4 to the case of multiple symmetric
honest suppliers.
Proposition 4 states that, for this power family of cost distributions, the
distortions that bribery introduces (discussed in Section 4) help reduce the price
paid by the buyer when the DS is the stronger supplier. As we discussed before,
the optimal rent-reducing distortion would favor allocation of the contract to the
weaker supplier in order to reduce the information rents of the stronger supplier.
However, allowing the opportunity for the stronger supplier to bribe the
auctioneer can also achieve the ultimate goal of a lower expected price. This may
seem paradoxical. The explanation is that, when the auctioneer appropriates part
of the rents in the form of bribe, the buyer should also be concerned that these
rents will cause an increase in the expected price. As a result, the auction-
theoretic device of decomposing the expected price into the sum of the expected
cost and the information rents is less helpful in analyzing the effect of distortions
on expected prices in auctions with bribery. Instead we should consider the
expected price directly as the winning bid. By doing so, we realize that the only
advantage of bribery for the buyer is that the HS faces fiercer competition in that
he must beat the cost of the DS instead of the "bid" of this DS.21  Consider the
case α = 1. If the DS is the weaker supplier, bribery can only have a small impact
on the bid of the stronger HS. The reason is that the "bid" of the weaker DS is
very close to his cost. Thus, competing against the cost of the DS instead of his
"bid" provides very little incentive for the stronger HS to bid more aggressively.
The situation is reversed if the DS is the stronger supplier.  In an (efficient)
auction there is a large gap between the cost and the "bid" of the stronger DS.
Thus, the competition faced by the weaker HS becomes much tougher when he
has to beat the cost of the DS instead of the "bid" of the DS. This provides a
stronger incentive for the weaker HS to bid more aggressively.
                                                
21 Since we are discussing the comparison to an efficient auction here, "bid" should be understood
as the expected price conditional on winning.
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As in Section 4, Proposition 4 illustrates the direct effect of bribery on
how aggressive the DS bids. But there is also a "slope effect". The change in the
slope of the bidding function of the HS has less intuitive effects on the bidding
function of the DS. The importance of these effects is clearer when we consider
the effects of bribery on a FPA. Proposition 4 only compares the asymmetric FPA
with bribery to an efficient auction with no allocative distortions. However, it is
also interesting to compare the expected prices in an FPA with and without
bribery. Let ),(1 hd ttEp  be the expected price paid by the buyer in a FPA without
bribery. This comparison is straight-forward for the symmetric case. When α < 1,
),;( ttEp α > ),;1( ttEp = ),(1 ttEp = ),(2 ttEp . For the asymmetric case, the
comparison is more difficult because the asymmetric FPA without bribery does
not have analytic solutions for the bidding functions even with this power family
of cost distributions. Nevertheless, using numerical computations, we can show
that bribery may increase or decrease the expected price paid by the buyer in a
FPA when α is close to 1. When td = 4 and th = 1, the expected price paid by the
buyer is .4943 in a FPA without bribery. (See Marshall, Meurer, Richard, and
Stromquist,1994.) Alternatively, with bribery and α = 1, the expected price is
.4958. Thus, bribery increases the expected price paid by the buyer, even though
α = 1. However, when td = 3 and th = 2, the expected prices in a FPA without and
with bribery are .4125 and .4122, respectively. Thus, bribery reduces the expected
price for this case. Notice that both cases are in the region td > th. Thus, even
though the stronger supplier is the DS in both cases, the effect of bribery on the
expected price can have either sign.
We can further illustrate the comparison using the Bidcomp2 program of
Li and Riley (1999) to compute the asymmetric FPA without bribery. Figure 2
illustrates the expected price with and without bribery for values of the capacity
parameters (td,th) with α = 1.
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td
th
8
8
Figure 2:  Expected Prices 
First-Price Auction with (α = 1) and without Bribery
3
6
64
Ep(α=1) > Ep1
Ep(α=1) < Ep1
Ep(α=1) > Ep1*
*(3,2)
(4,1)
4
2
The expected prices are equal along the diagonal (a property special to the power
family of cost distributions), and the expected price with bribery is always greater
when td < th. However, when td > th, the expected price with bribery is lower
when td is only somewhat larger than th. The expected price with bribery is again
higher in the lower right region where td is substantially greater than th. The
previous examples from Marshall, Meurer, Richard, and Stromquist(1994) are
marked by asterisks in Figure 2.
7. Conclusion
We have examined the effects of bribery on the behavior of suppliers and the
outcome of a FPA. In the particular form of bribery that we have considered, one
supplier bribes the auctioneer in order to revise his bid downward when this is
necessary to win the contract and profitable. We have shown that this form of
bribery need not make the dishonest supplier bid less aggressively or the honest
supplier bid more aggressively. Bribery distorts the allocation of the contract. In
cases where the dishonest supplier is the ex ante stronger supplier, bribery
reverses the distortion that would exists in a FPA without bribery. Even when the
dishonest supplier is ex ante weaker, bribery alters the allocation of the contract in
fundamental ways. In particular, an inefficient allocation of the contract to the
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weaker dishonest supplier occurs with high probability even when the cost of the
stronger honest supplier is very low. For similar reasons, these properties of the
allocation in the FPA with bribery contrast sharply with the allocation induced by
optimal mechanisms. The effects of bribery on the expected price paid by the
buyer are subtle. When the auctioneer appropriates a large fraction of the surplus,
the price for the buyer may in fact be lower than in the absence of bribery. This in
fact occurs when the stronger supplier is the dishonest supplier with the
opportunity to bribe the auctioneer.
There are other interesting questions that could be addressed with variants of
this model. We have used some to analyze the effect of bribery on the incentives
to invest, and the resulting implications for trade (Burguet and Perry (2006)), and
the incentives for the sale of preference by a buyer in the form of a right of first
refusal (Burguet and Perry (2003, revised 2005)). Despite its simplicity, the
model highlights subtle but intuitive consequences of auctioneer discretion in a
wide range of contracting scenarios.
Appendix 1: Second-Order Conditions
Monotonicity of the inverse hazard rate implies (inverse) monotonicity of )(bJd .
The first order condition (2) can be written as:
 .0     )]([)( =−⋅ bJcbg dd
The derivative of the left-hand side is
)(')(   )]([)(' bJbgbJcbg dddd ⋅−−⋅  ,
which, using the first-order condition, shows that the second-order conditions are
satisfied under our assumptions. Thus, (2) defines an interior solution of (1). Let
)()( 1 bJcb dh
−=  as implicitly defined in (2). Note that since )(bJd  is increasing
and convex, )(cbh  is increasing and concave. Now (4) can be written as
0     
))((
))((1 
))(('
)())(( =



 −−−⋅−
bJg
bJG
bJb
cbbJg
dh
dh
dd
dh
α .
As before, the second-order conditions are satisfied if the term in brackets is
increasing in b. Since  )(bJd is increasing, it suffices to show that
)(
)(1 
)('
))((
xg
xG
xb
cxb
h
h
h
h −−−α
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is increasing in x. The second term is decreasing, and the first term is increasing
since )(cbd  is concave. Thus, second-order conditions are satisfied. The Lemma
follows immediately.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4
Using the bidding functions from Section 6, we can calculate the expected price
paid by the buyer in the FPA with bribery:
(A1)     
h
h
h
h
d
d
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d
hd
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t
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t
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Also, we can calculate the expected price in a SPA:
 (A3)   
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Proof of Proposition (4):
(i) When td > th, expression (A1) for the expected price applies over the entire
range of the bribe share of α ≤ 1. This expected price is continuous and declines
as α  increases over this range.  At α = 0, this expected price is clearly greater
than the expected price under a SPA from (A3). However, at α = 1, the condition
that td > th implies that this expected price is lower than the expected price under a
SPA.  Thus, there exists an α  such that for all α >α , bribery would result in a
lower expected price. The value of  α  can be easily defined as
 .
)1/(1
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Note that α  need not be close to unity. If th = 1, then α = .89 when td = 2 ,α =
.75 when td = 3 , α = .67 when td = 4 . It is also easy to show that α  is decreasing
in td.
(ii) When td < th, expression (A1) for the expected price applies only for α ≤ td /th.
But under the condition that td < th, this expected price is greater that the expected
20
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 23
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art23
price under a SPA from (A3) at α = td /th, and thus for all α ≤ td /th. When td = th,
expression (A1) applies for all α ≤ 1, exceeds the expected price in a SPA for α <
1, and equals the expected price in a SPA for α = 1. Q.E.D.
With the power family of cost distributions, we can solve for the
asymmetric case in which there is one dishonest supplier but two or more
symmetric honest suppliers. If the DS has capacity td and n honest suppliers each
have the same capacity th , the equilibrium bidding function of each HS will be
bh(c;n) = (1+Td⋅c)/(1+Td), where Td = td + (n - 1)⋅th. Clearly, this bidding function
becomes more aggressive as the number of honest suppliers is increased. Also
note that in the fully symmetric case when td = th, the bidding function of the
honest suppliers is the same as it would be in a FPA without bribery. This follows
from the results in Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2004) and Porter and
Shoham (2004) because the inverse hazard rate of the power family of cost
distributions is linearly decreasing in the cost. The equilibrium bidding function
of the DS would then be bd(c;n) = (1+α⋅nth⋅c)/(1+α⋅nth) for c > c′, and bd(c;n) =
1/(1+Td), for c ≤ c′, where c′ = max{0, [α⋅nth - Td]/[α⋅nth·(1+Td)]}. Thus, the
bidding functions are parallel to those from (7) and (8), with Td replacing td and
nth replacing th.  Proposition 4 still applies to this case with an arbitrary number n
of honest suppliers. Of course, the lower bound α on the set of bribe shares that
generate a lower expected price would be modified. The expressions in (A1) and
(A2) are modified as follows:
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The expression for the expected price in a SPA auction is also easily modified as
(A6)
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The result that corresponds to Proposition 4(i) can be proved in the same manner
as the case of n = 1. In particular, Td replaces td and nth replaces th in the
inequality comparing the expected prices when α = 1.  The result that there exists
an 1)( <nα  for td > th follows from the fact that:  td > th if and only if Td > nth.
The result that corresponds to Proposition 4(ii) can also be proved in the same
manner as the case of n = 1.
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